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I. INTRODUCTION
On April 17, 2007, the United States Supreme Court handed down a long awaited
opinion concerning the constitutionality of a law banning a single, specific abortion
procedure.1 The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act (the Act) criminalized a surgical
procedure known as “intact D & E” or “D & X” [hereafter D & X].2 The method,
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1

Gonzales v. Carhart, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).

2

Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp 2d 805 (2004). D & E refers to dilation and extraction.
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which is extremely rare and used only after the first trimester of pregnancy, is known
outside of the medical community as “partial-birth abortion.”3
In the months of litigation leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision to review
the Act, opponents had expressed two primary concerns. First, the Act lacked an
exception for the health of the mother. The Supreme Court mandated such an
exception in Roe v. Wade and reaffirmed its position numerous times, most recently
in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England.4 Second, while
proponents claimed it applied only to D & X, it was actually broad enough to include
all surgical techniques used after thirteen and one third weeks of gestation, thus,
imposing an undue burden on women undergoing abortion after that point.
Three federal districts courts agreed with those challenging the Act. The
decisions of these courts were upheld by the circuit courts which reviewed the
Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003.5 For guidance, all of the courts reviewing
the Act relied on a 2000 Supreme Court opinion finding almost identical language in
a Nebraska law to be unconstitutional.6 Surprisingly, the Supreme Court agreed to
review two of the circuit court cases.
Before the Supreme Court accepted certiorari, in what appeared to be no more
than an attempt to circumvent the judicial system, the 109th United States Congress
considered a new abortion measure. If passed, the Unborn Child Pain Awareness
Act would have forced abortion providers to deliver a scripted message to women
requesting abortion services.7 Under this legislation, physicians violate the law
unless they inform patients who have attained thirteen and one third weeks of
pregnancy that “the process of being killed in an abortion will cause the unborn child
pain.”8 Sponsors claimed that the bill merely required “informed consent” but
opponents contended that the language was meant to dissuade women from
undergoing second trimester abortions. Congress was also criticized for choosing
physicians to deliver the government’s message about fetal pain, a topic on which
the medical community has not reached a consensus.

3

Id. In 2001, 1.4 percent of abortions were performed at twenty-one weeks or more. Lilo
T. Strauss et al., Abortion Surveillance --- United States, 2001, 53 (SS09) MORBIDITY &
MORTALITY WKLY. REP. SURVEILLANCE SUMMARIES 1, 1-32 (2004), available at
http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/ss5309a1.htm (last visited May 22, 2007).
4

Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of N. New Eng., 546 U.S. 320 (2006) (stating that “our
precedents hold, that a State may not restrict access to abortions that are ‘necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for preservation of the life or health of the mother’”). See also
Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992) (plurality opinion) (quoting
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 164–165 (1973), “[i]f the State is interested in protecting fetal life
after viability, it may go so far as to proscribe abortion during that period, except when it is
necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother”).
5

Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v.
Gonzales, 453 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006); Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d
Cir. 2006).
6

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 948 (2000).

7

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, H.R. 356, 109th Cong. (2005); see also
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005).
8

Id.
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Laws mandating disclosure of particular information are known as informed
consent laws. They exist primarily in the area of reproductive health and most often
apply to women seeking abortion. This article discusses the legal and ethical issues
that arise when lawmakers decide what patients must be told before they can access
certain medical procedures.
Part II examines some of the ethical implications of informed consent laws.
Physicians have a duty to obtain a patient’s informed consent before acting.9 The
duty to inform arises from the principle of individual autonomy.10 In the past,
physicians were sometimes accused of withholding material information from
patients. This paternalism was justified on the ground that the patient would not
want to know all of the negative or unpleasant facts. As a result of litigation,
legislation, and a change in public perception about the appropriate balance in the
doctor-patient relationship, physician paternalism has given way to patient selfdetermination.11
Part III discusses legal concerns raised by informed consent laws. These include
the First Amendment free speech rights of physicians12 and patients’ right to obtain
their physicians’ advice and counsel without government interference.13 This article
examines two United States Supreme Court cases that addressed these aspects of
informed consent and the implications of the Court’s holdings for fetal pain informed
consent legislation.14
Part IV reviews two recent pieces of federal legislation with the potential to
significantly affect abortion practice and the lives of women who seek abortion
services. The first law, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, criminalized two
common abortion procedures.15 Although signed into law in 2003,16 implementation
of the Act was enjoined by three federal courts.17 Ultimately, the decisions of the
Court of Appeals for the Eighth and Ninth Circuits were reversed by the United
States Supreme Court.18
9

Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 782-83 (D.C. Cir. 1972). “The doctrine that a consent
effective as authority to perform therapy can arise only from the patient’s understanding of
alternatives to and risks of the therapy is commonly denominated ‘informed consent.’” Id. at
780 n.15 (citation omitted).
10

Id. at 786.

11

Id.

12

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992).
13

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

14

Rust, 500 U.S. at 173; Casey, 505 U.S. at 833.

15

Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).

16

Id.

17

Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 437 F.3d
278 (2d Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp 2d 957 (N.D.
Cal. 2004), aff’d, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006); Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp 2d 805 (D.
Neb. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005).
18
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007);
Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 127 S.
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Prior to the 2007 Gonzales v. Carhart decision, members of Congress introduced
a second bill aimed at eliminating mid-trimester surgical abortions. The Unborn
Child Pain Awareness Act would criminalize the performance of abortions after
thirteen-and-one-third weeks of pregnancy without first informing the patient that
the fetus would experience profound pain.19 Additionally, it required the abortion
provider to offer the option of fetal anesthesia.20 Judging from the title, it was not
readily apparent that the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act was aimed at curbing
late-term abortion but the surrounding circumstances suggested just that. This
article argues that Congress’s use of this back door approach to achieving its
objective actually undermined its credibility and its chance for success.
Part V briefly reviews the cases that identified and defined the constitutional
right to an abortion.21 It then discusses cases where courts considered the
constitutionality of informed consent laws and compares the reasoning of those
courts to the arguments likely to be raised in any challenge to the federal Unborn
Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005.
Part VI summarizes the findings of a team of physicians at the University of
California at San Francisco, concluding that fetal perception of pain is unlikely prior
to twenty-nine weeks gestation. Reaction to the article, which appeared in the
August 2005 issue of the Journal of the American Medical Association, was positive
for the most part.22 Some physicians as well as pro-life advocates, however,
criticized the article as no more than an effort to discredit fetal pain legislation.
II. ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT
“[I]t is the prerogative of the patient, not the physician, to determine
for himself the direction in which his interests seem to lie.”23
Informed consent encompasses the principle that an individual is entitled to
decide what will happen to her body. Furthermore, based on this individual right
physicians incur a duty to inform each patient about the potential risks and benefits
of any recommended medical treatment.24 The physician’s duty arises from the
concept, “fundamental in American jurisprudence, that ‘[e]very human being of
adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own
body. . . .’”25
Ct. 1610 (2007). The Supreme Court heard oral argument in both cases on Nov. 8, 2006. It
handed down an opinion in April 2007.
19

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005).

20

Id.

21

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

22

Susan J. Lee et al., Fetal Pain: A Systematic Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence,
294 JAMA 947, 947-54 (2005).
23

Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 781 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

24

Id. at 780. “True consent to what happens to one’s self is the informed exercise of a
choice, and that entails an opportunity to evaluate knowledgeably the options and the risks
attendant upon each.” Id.
25

Id. (quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914)).
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In the seminal informed consent case, Cantebury v. Spence, the Court of Appeals
for the D.C. Circuit held that a physician has a duty to communicate the specific
information that a patient needs to make an informed decision.26 Other courts judged
the extent of the physician’s duty by what prudent physicians disclosed in similar
circumstances.27 The Cantebury court rejected this reasoning, finding that neither
the obligation to disclose nor the scope of disclosure originates from a community
standard.28 Instead, the physician’s duty and the scope of his obligation to inform
originate from the patient’s right of self-determination.29 That right cannot be
exercised effectively unless the patient possesses “enough information to enable an
intelligent choice.”30 Thus, the scope of the physician’s duty requires disclosure of
information that the patient would find material to making a treatment decision, to
weighing the risks associated with having or not having the treatment, and to decide
on any alternative treatment.31
The Cantebury court recognized that there are two instances where a physician
holds the privilege not to disclose.32 The first arises in an emergency situation where
a patient is incapable of consent.33 The second situation is one where the disclosure
may be so detrimental to the patient that it is medically contraindicated.34 The second
exception provides leeway for the physician to determine, within limits, what is in a
patient’s best interests to know and to tailor disclosure to a patient’s unique
circumstance.35 This exception has been invoked in the context of informed consent
for abortion. Some physicians feel that giving a detailed account of the effect of
abortion on the fetus is harmful to the health interests of the patient.36

26

Id. at 781.

27

Id. at 783-84.

28

Id. at 780-81, 786.
In our view, the patient’s right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to
reveal. That right can be effectively exercised only if the patient possesses enough
information to enable an intelligent choice. The scope of the physician’s
communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and that
need is the information material to the decision.
Id. at 786.
29

Id. at 780-81.

30

Id. at 786.

31

Id. at 782.

32

Id. at 788.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 789.

35

Id.

36

Permits Human Stem Cell Research in New Jersey: Hearing on S.1909 Before the S.
Comm. on Health, Human Serv., and Senior Citizens, 2002-2003 Leg. Sess. (Nov. 4, 2002)
(statement of Dr. Dianne Irving, Professor of Philosophy, Catholic University of America)
[hereinafter Statement of Dr. Dianne Irving], available at http://www.njleg.state.nj.us/media/
archive_audio2.asp?KEY=SHH&SESSION=2002.
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There are three important public policy reasons behind designating to physicians
responsibility for obtaining the informed consent of patients. First, physicians have
knowledge and experience beyond that of the average patient, putting them in a
position to provide information about disease processes, risks and benefits of
potential treatments, and prognoses.37 Second, the personal and intimate nature of
the doctor-patient relationship invites the patient to rely on the advice and expertise
of the physician.38 Third, the idea that physicians owe patients a duty of care is
already established in tort law, such that failure to obtain a patient’s informed
consent breaches that duty and gives rise to a claim of negligence.39 The underlying
public policy is to ensure that patients have sufficient facts for making health care
decisions. Physicians are uniquely qualified and properly motivated to see that
patients get the information they need.
The scope of informed consent in the context of a decision regarding abortion has
been thoroughly examined through litigation. In 1992, the United States Supreme
Court found that a Pennsylvania informed consent law did not intrude on a
physician’s prerogative to tailor information to the needs of individual patients.40
The law at issue in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
contained an exception to the informed consent requirement where the physician
determined that disclosing certain information would have “a severely adverse effect
on the physical or mental health of the patient.”41 If a statute mandated informed
consent but failed to include an exception like the one found in Casey, the common
law exception to the duty to disclose recognized in Cantebury would still permit
physicians to withhold information that would adversely affect a patient’s health. 42
The duty to inform suggests several questions of particular significance to
abortion providers. First, in the rapidly evolving field of medicine, what should be
the extent of a physician’s duty to possess “state of the art” knowledge? At least one
commentator has called for a standard that would require physicians providing
abortion services to stay abreast of research on fetal development in order to inform
patients of the “most internationally agreed upon, objective, current, and accurate
scientific facts.”43
This could include advances in fetal neurology, fetal
consciousness, and fetal pain. Dr. Dianne Irving, a professor of philosophy at the

37

Cantebury, 464 F.2d at 787. “Indeed, with knowledge of, or ability to learn, his patient’s
background and current condition, he is in a position superior to that of most others--attorneys,
for example--who are called upon to make judgments on pain of liability in damages for
unreasonable miscalculation (citation omitted).” Id.
38

Id. at 782. “The patient’s reliance upon the physician is a trust of the kind which
traditionally has exacted obligations beyond those associated with armslength transactions.
His dependence upon the physician for information affecting his well-being … is well-nigh
abject.” Id.
39

Id. at 781, 783.

40

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

41

Id. at 883-84.

42

Cantebury, 464 F.2d at 788-89.

43

Statement of Dr. Dianne Irving, supra note 36. Dr. Irving is a former bench research
biochemist and biologist with the National Institutes of Health—National Cancer Institute.
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Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C., testified before a New Jersey
Senate Committee about the ethical implications of informed consent and legislation
regulating fetal stem cell research and human cloning.44 She claimed that, “‘informed
consent’ requires that full, accurate, and truthful information be disseminated to all
concerned decision makers.” Dr. Irving maintained that in a discussion of informed
consent requirements, the first inquiry must be into the state of existing scientific
evidence.45 Like abortion, this is a highly disruptive subject often open to emotional
appeals from those on both sides of the debate. Both topics raise the question of
when human life begins. Dr. Irving based her conclusions about the beginning of
human life on the findings of the Nomina Embryologica Committee, an international
body “consisting of over 20 of the best and brightest human embryologist’s from
around the world.”46 If policy makers fail to rely on internationally agreed upon
scientific facts, she warned that “public policy will continue to be irresponsibly
based on mere fantasies and wishful thinking.”47
Physicians’ duty to inform suggests a second question. Where informed consent
statutes essentially substitute the judgment of lawmakers for the judgment of
physicians, should legislators be expected to be equally as informed as physicians
must be? Politicians are increasingly involved in regulating the content of informed
consent. As such, it follows that any standard governing physicians’ level of
knowledge must apply equally to legislators. While this makes logical sense, there is
presently no mechanism in place, other than the democratic process, to ensure that
policy makers are adequately informed. By contrast, a well developed system exists
for monitoring physician practice, including oversight by federal, state, and various
private agencies. A physician must meet state licensure requirements, adhere to
federal guidelines if participating in federally funded programs such as Medicare and
Medicaid, comply with federal standards to qualify for a license to prescribe
controlled substances, and practice in conformance with the regulations imposed by
the hospital(s) where she has staff privileges.48 A physician may be further regulated
by professional organizations and specialty boards. Medical malpractice litigation is
another means of enforcing adherence to recognized standards of care. If legislators
are allowed to be the arbiters of what information should be communicated by
doctors to their patients, then a similar regulatory scheme should apply to them. For
practical purposes, it is difficult to imagine how our present system of government
might accomplish this.
A congressional body cannot possess the qualities deemed necessary for
determining what information patients need in order to make educated health care
44

Id.

45

Id.

46

Id. “After reviewing the latest research studies in human embryology, [the Nomina
Embryologica Committee’s] deliberations are published in the Nomina Embryologica, part of
the larger Nomina Anatomica, and are professionally required to be used, along with The
Carnegie Stages of Early Human Development, by all human embryologists in their own
work.” Id.
47
48

Id.

61 AM. JUR. 2D Physicians, Surgeons, Etc. § 9 (2006); 70 C.J.S. Physicians and
Surgeons § 9 (2006).
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decisions. Yet through the introduction of informed consent laws, Congress and
state legislatures around the country are challenging physicians for the right to make
these determinations. At their core, informed consent laws are no more than an
attempt to substitute the judgment of elected politicians for that of physicians. This
article argues that legislative bodies, for the reasons suggested above, are not well
suited to decide what is in patients’ best interests. Physicians are still far better
equipped to inform and advise their patients.
Cantebury v. Spence held that physicians must disclose information material to a
patient’s decision.49 Today, this means that physicians should be familiar enough
with contemporary research to understand how it might apply to their patients.
Whether it is in a particular patient’s best interest to have specific information,
however, is still a decision for physicians, not lawmakers.50
III. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMED CONSENT LAWS
In the past, physicians resisted informed consent laws on the basis that a
legislatively imposed mandate to disclose particular information violated their First
Amendment free speech rights.51 There is established First Amendment precedent
for this argument.52 Before it became a health care issue, the question of compelled
speech was raised in other contexts.53 In the 1940’s, the United States Supreme
Court twice considered whether public school students could be forced to participate
in patriotic exercises that included a pledge of allegiance to the United States, where
the school child or his parents objected to the content of the pledge.54 Reversing its
earlier precedent,55 the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
held that compelling an individual to speak infringed his rights in the same way that
restricting his speech did.56 Barnette and later cases challenging compelled speech in
schools differ in two important ways from current challenges to mandatory informed
consent laws. First, the Court recognized that the students in Barnette were

49

See generally Cantebury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 (D.C. Cir. 1972).

50

Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1345 (D.N.D. 1980). The court considered a bill
requiring physicians to disclose:
the ‘probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the unborn child at the
time the abortion is to be performed….’ The physician must be permitted to exercise
medical judgment and determine to what extent, if any, disclosure in this area is in the
patient's best interest. To require such disclosure to every patient impermissibly
injects the state into the private physician-patient relationship.
Id.
51

See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833 (1992).
52

W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

53

Id. See also Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

54

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624; Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 586.

55

Gobitis, 310 U.S. at 586.

56

Barnette, 319 U.S. at 624.
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essentially being forced to adopt an ideology.57 Laws requiring physicians to make
statements to patients about government’s appraisal of the risks and benefits
associated with a proposed treatment do not force physicians to accept the
government’s view as their own.58 Second, the Court emphasized that children are
particularly vulnerable to coercion.59 Informed consent laws, on the other hand, apply
to physicians, a group that is not so readily coerced.
In 1991, the Supreme Court directly addressed physicians’ free speech rights in
Rust v. Sullivan.60 In Rust, family planning clinics that received Title X funds were
ineligible for the funding if they offered abortion services, including counseling.61
Physicians were not permitted to discuss abortion as an option or even to refer a
patient to another clinic that could present the full range of alternatives.62 Physicians
working in these clinics brought suit, claiming that the regulation abridged their free
speech rights and unduly interfered with the doctor-patient relationship.63 The Court
disagreed with the physicians.64 Instead, the Court reframed the issue as whether
Congress could impose restrictions as a condition of receiving a federal grant.65 The
grantee was free to reject Title X funds and continue to counsel patients about
abortion services; thus, there was no government interference with speech.66
The Court also rejected the physician’s contention that the regulation imposed
significantly on the doctor-patient relationship.67 The clinics provided family
planning services only. The doctor-patient relationship, therefore, was not
“sufficiently all encompassing so as to justify an expectation on the part of the
patient of comprehensive medical advice.”68 A patient would, therefore, not mistake
the clinic physician’s silence about abortion to mean that the physician did not
consider abortion an alternative in her case.69 The Court also noted that the
regulations did not require any physician “to represent as his own any opinion that he
does not in fact hold.”70
57
Id. at 633. The pledge and salute require an “affirmation of a belief and an attitude of
mind.” Id.
58

Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 200 (1991).

59

Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).

60

Rust, 500 U.S. at 173.

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

Id.

64

Id.

65

Id.

66

Id. at 199. “Title X subsidies are just that, subsidies . . . to avoid the force of the
regulations, [the recipient] can simply decline the subsidy.” Id.
67

Id. at 200.

68

Id.

69

Id.

70

Id.
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In 1992, the Supreme Court considered an informed consent law imposing a duty
on physicians to affirmatively provide specific information to patients undergoing
abortion.71 Unlike the physicians in Rust, these doctors were not receiving
government grants.72 The statute at issue in Planned Parenthood of Pennsylvania v.
Casey specified that a physician performing an abortion must “inform the woman of
the nature of the abortion procedure, the health risks of the abortion and of
childbirth, and the ‘probable gestational age of the unborn child.’”73 In addition, the
physician or a “qualified nonphysician” was required to “inform the woman of the
availability of printed materials published by the State describing the fetus. . . .”74
The doctors argued that they had a First Amendment right “not to provide
information about the risks of abortion, and childbirth, in a manner mandated by the
State.”75 While agreeing that the Pennsylvania law implicated the physicians’ First
Amendment rights not to speak, the Supreme Court found that the rights applied only
to the physicians’ practice of medicine, which was already subject to regulation and
licensure by the states.76 Furthermore, the law itself contained an exception.77
Physicians were not required to disclose information to a patient where disclosure
would adversely affect the patient’s physical or mental health.78
Under Rust and Casey, the federal government is free to restrict speech as a
condition for the receipt of grant money. The case law allows states to go further
and impose “informed consent” obligations on all doctors, at least to the extent that
any such law contains an exception in cases where disclosure would adversely affect
a patient.
IV. FEDERAL ABORTION LEGISLATION
A. Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
President Bush signed the federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act [hereinafter
PBABA] into law on November 5, 2003.79 Congress passed the law partially out of

71

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).

72

Id.

73

Id. at 881.

74

Id. Additionally, the statute required the physician or qualified nonphysician to provide
“information about medical assistance for childbirth, information about child support from the
father, and a list of agencies which provide adoption and other services as alternatives to
abortion.” Id.
75

Id. at 884.

76

Id. at 885.

77

Id. at 883.

78

Id. at 883-84. In order to exercise this exception the physician must be able to
“demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence, that he or she reasonably believed that
furnishing the information would have resulted in a severely adverse effect on the physical or
mental health of the patient.” Id.
79

Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
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concern that fetuses were subjected to pain during late-term abortion procedures.80
Given its conclusion that a fetus is capable of experiencing pain, Congress deemed
partial-birth abortion, also termed D&X, to be exceptionally barbaric and cruel.81
The PBABA was enacted to stop D&X abortions. D&X was only minimally
different from another method common in the second trimester of pregnancy known
as intact D&E.82 In a challenge to a Nebraska law with language similar to the
federal ban,83 the United States Supreme Court held that the wording used was broad
enough to encompass both D&E and D&X.84 Since the statute outlawed D&E and
D&X, the two most common procedures used for late-term abortions, it placed an

80

§ 1531, Congressional Findings § 2(14)(M). “It is a medical fact, however, that unborn
infants at this stage can feel pain when subjected to painful stimuli and that their perception of
this pain is even more intense than that of newborn infants and older children when subjected
to the same stimuli.” Id.
81
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791, 794 (8th Cir. 2005). Two procedures are currently
referred to as partial-birth abortion: “intact D&E” and “D&X.” From the perspective of fetal
pain, these procedures are arguably more humane than D&E. In an intact D&E abortion, the
fetus is delivered intact into the vagina. “If the fetus presents head first the physician collapses
the skull of the fetus and then removes the ‘intact’ fetus.” If the fetus presents feet first, the
physician “pulls the fetal body through the cervix, collapses the skull, and extracts the fetus
through the cervix.” The D&E involves grasping a fetus with clamps and pulling it through a
partially dilated maternal cervix into the vagina. Cervical resistance causes dismemberment of
the fetus while the brain and neurological system remain intact.
82

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 948 (2000).

83

Id. at 921-22. The Supreme Court described the Nebraska Act as:
‘No partial-birth abortion shall be performed in this state, unless such procedure is
necessary to save the life of the mother whose life is endangered by a physical
disorder, physical illness, or physical injury, including a life-endangering physical
condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself.’ The statute defines ‘partial
birth abortion’ as: ‘an abortion procedure in which the person performing the abortion
partially delivers vaginally a living unborn child before killing the unborn child and
completing the delivery.’ It further defines ‘partially delivers vaginally a living unborn
child before killing the unborn child’ to mean ‘deliberately and intentionally
delivering into the vagina a living unborn child, or a substantial portion thereof, for the
purpose of performing a procedure that the person performing such procedure knows
will kill the unborn child and does kill the unborn child.’
Id. (citations omitted). See also Stuart Derbyshire, Late Abortion and the ‘Fetal Pain’
Fallacy: The USA’s Ban on ‘Partial-Birth Abortion’ Rests on Flawed Arguments About Fetal
Development, Spiked Essays, Mar. 15, 2005, http://www.spiked-online.com/Articles/0000
000CA93C.htm. The Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003 prohibits:
[A]n abortion in which the person performing the abortion (A) deliberately and
intentionally vaginally delivers a living fetus until, in the case of a head-first
presentation, the entire fetal head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of a
breech presentation, any part of the fetal trunk past the navel is outside the body of the
mother, for the purpose of performing an overt act that the person knows will kill the
partially delivered fetus; and (B) performs the overt act, other than completion of
delivery, that kills the partially delivered living fetus.
18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).
84

Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 922.
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undue burden on a woman seeking an abortion after twenty weeks gestation;
therefore, the legislation was found unconstitutional.85
Under the PBABA, a practitioner employing one of the banned methods could be
fined up to two hundred fifty thousand dollars and sentenced to up to two years in
prison.86 Shortly after the bill was signed into law, Dr. Leroy Carhart, the National
Abortion Federation, and Planned Parenthood each filed for an injunction to prevent
its implementation.87 The various plaintiffs alleged that the PBABA was
unconstitutional because it did not contain an exception allowing the procedures
when necessary to preserve a woman’s health.88 In addition, they asserted that the
PBABA was unconstitutionally vague, imposed an undue burden on a woman’s right
to choose an abortion, served no legitimate state interest, violated women’s right to
equal protection under the law, and provided a constitutionally insufficient exception
for allowing procedures to save a woman’s life.89
Concurrent trials were conducted in federal courts in New York, California, and
Nebraska.90 All three courts concluded that the law was unconstitutional.91 Each of
the decisions was appealed and upheld by the appropriate Court of Appeals.92 In a
lengthy and detailed opinion in one of the cases, Carhart v. Ashcroft, Federal District
Court Judge Richard Kopf recounted the testimony of dozens of physicians who
provided abortions.93 Applying Supreme Court precedent, Judge Kopf found the ban
unconstitutional on the ground that it lacked a health exception.94 The Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court’s ruling.95 While this

85
Id. at 914. The court does not define “late-term abortion” but seems to use “abortion
after twenty weeks gestation” and “late-term abortion” interchangeably.
86

Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, 18 U.S.C. § 1531 (2006).

87

Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Ashcroft, 330 F. Supp 2d 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004); Planned
Parenthood Fed’n of Am. v. Ashcroft, 320 F. Supp 2d 957 (N.D. Cal. 2004); Carhart v.
Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004).
88
The United States Supreme Court held in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973),
that such an exception is a requisite component of any restrictive scheme. See also Planned
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 879 (1992).
89
Derbyshire, supra note 83. Stuart Derbyshire is assistant professor of radiology and
anesthesiology at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center.
90

Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. Supp 2d at 436; Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 320 F.
Supp 2d at 957; Carhart, 331 F. Supp 2d at 805.
91

Nat’l Abortion Fed’n, 330 F. Supp 2d at 436; Planned Parenthood Fed’n of Am., 320 F.
Supp 2d at 957; Carhart, 331 F. Supp 2d at 805.
92
Nat’l Abortion Fed’n v. Gonzales, 437 F.3d 278 (2d Cir. 2006); Planned Parenthood
Fed’n of Am. v. Gonzales, 435 F.3d 1163 (9th Cir. 2006), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007);
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
93

Carhart, 331 F. Supp 2d at 805 (Kopf, J.).

94

Id.

95

The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Court of Appeals for the Eight Circuit.
Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 127 S. Ct. 1610 (2007).
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litigation was in progress over the constitutionality of the PBABA, Congress
introduced similar legislation under the guise of preventing fetal pain.96
B. Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005
In January 2005, Senator Sam Brownback (R-KS) and various co-sponsors
introduced a bill entitled the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005 [hereinafter
UCPA Act]; its stated purpose was “[t]o ensure that women seeking an abortion are
fully informed regarding the pain experienced by their unborn child.”97 The UCPA
Act arose out of concern over the capacity of a fetus to experience pain.98 Whether
fetuses perceive pain has been debated for over two decades99 but testimony
presented during the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act trials regarding the severe pain
experienced by the fetus renewed congressional concern.100
The UCPA Act states in pertinent part:
An abortion provider or the provider’s agent . . . shall make the following
oral statement to the pregnant woman . . . : You are considering having
96

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005). The bill included
language similar to that found in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003, describing the
abortion methods commonly used at twenty weeks after fertilization.
Examples of abortion methods used twenty weeks after fertilization include, but are
not limited to the following:
(A) The Dilation and Evacuation (D&E) method of abortion is commonly performed
in the second trimester of pregnancy. In a dilation and evacuation abortion, the unborn
child’s body parts are grasped at random with a long-toothed clamp. The fetal body
parts are then torn off of the body and pulled out of the vaginal canal. The remaining
body parts are grasped and pulled out until only the head remains. The head is then
grasped and crushed in order to remove it from the vaginal canal.
(B) Partial-Birth Abortion is an abortion in which the abortion practitioner delivers an
unborn child’s body until only the head remains inside the womb, punctures the back
of the child’s skull with a sharp instrument, and sucks the child’s brains out before
completing the delivery of the dead infant.
Id.
97

Id. Similar legislation was introduced by Rep. Christopher Smith [R-NJ] in 2004. See
Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2004, H.R. 4420, 108th Cong. (2004), available at
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill= h108-4420. Three states enacted legislation in
2005 requiring physicians who provide abortions or abortion counseling to instruct patients
that a fetus feels pain. See Act of May 10, 2005, Woman’s Right to Know Act, H.B. 197 (to
be codified at GA. CODE ANN. §31-9A-4); see also Unborn Child Pain Awareness and
Prevention Act of 2005, No. 1696 (to be codified at ARK. CODE ANN. §§20-16-1101-1111);
see also H.F. 235, 2005 Leg. 84th Sess. (Mo. 2005).
98

Press Release, United States Senator Sam Brownback, Brownback Reintroduces Unborn
Child Pain Bill (Jan. 26, 2005), available at http://brownback.senate.gov/pressapp/record.cfm
?id=230920.
99
Teresa S. Collett, Fetal Pain Legislation: Is It Viable?, 30 PEPP. L. REV. 161, 161
(2003).
100

Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 760 Before the H. Subcomm.
on the Constitution of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2003) (statement of Dr.
Mark G. Neerhof, Associate Professor of Obstetrics and Gynecology, Northwestern University
Mecial School).
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an abortion of an unborn child who will have developed, at the time of the
abortion, approximately XX weeks after fertilization. The Congress of the
United States has determined that at this stage of development, an unborn
child has the physical structures necessary to experience pain . . .
Congress finds that there is substantial evidence that the process of being
killed in an abortion will cause the unborn child pain, even though you
receive a pain-reducing drug or drugs . . . [Y]ou have the option of
choosing to have anesthesia . . . administered directly to the pain-capable
unborn child if you so desire. The purpose of administering such drug or
drugs would be to reduce or eliminate the capacity of the unborn child to
experience pain during the abortion procedure. In some cases, there may
be some additional risk to you associated with administering such a
drug.101
Congress’ rationale for enacting federal legislation was government’s “interest in
reducing the number of events in which great pain is inflicted on sentient
creatures.”102 Congress analogized the UCPA Act to federal legislation protecting
animals during transportation and slaughter and laws protecting animals used in
research.103 The scientific community has criticized the UCPA Act and the
underlying medical science used to justify it.104 The legislation has three obvious
flaws, which undermine the credibility of Congress as fact finder. First, the
legislation is inconsistent with its stated goals. The bill was intended to reduce the
suffering of sentient creatures, yet it fails to consider fetal pain in all situations
where it may arise.105 Second, the scientific support for the bill is not accepted by
the majority of experts in science and medicine.106 Third, Congress invited
testimony from scientists who agree with its findings about fetal pain to the
exclusions of those who do not.107
The ostensible purpose of the bill is to eliminate fetal pain, yet the bill does not
address fetal pain in any context other than abortion. If Congress truly meant to
reduce fetal suffering it would have imposed similar informed consent standards in
all situations where a fetus might feel pain. For example, if, as Congress found, a
fetus is capable of experiencing pain at twenty weeks after fertilization, then
101

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. § 2902 (2005)
(emphasis added).
102

Id. at § 2(7).

103

Id. at § 2(7)(A)-(C).

104

Derbyshire, supra note 83.

105

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, § 2(7). “There is a valid Federal
Government interest in reducing the number of events in which great pain is inflicted on
sentient creatures.” Id.
106
See, e.g., W. Huang et al., Management of Fetal Pain During Invasive Fetal
Procedures: A Review, 55 ACTA ANAESTHESIOLOGICA BELGICA 119 (2004); Lee, supra note
22.
107
For example, Congress heard testimony from Dr. K.S. Anand, who testified for the
federal government in the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act trials, but did not invite the
University of California at San Francisco investigators to present evidence.
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certainly a full-term fetus experiences significant pain during labor and the process
of birth.108 Modern diagnostic techniques enable physicians to diagnose painful fetal
conditions weeks or even months before birth.109 These fetuses would benefit from
pain management until the condition can be corrected. Until recently, it was
uncommon for the parents of male newborns to be consulted about whether they
wanted their infant to receive anesthesia or analgesia for a circumcision surgery. A
child recently born should be eligible for the same protection as the unborn child.
Yet the UCPA Act does not require a physician to offer anesthesia for the fetus
during labor and birth, does not require ongoing pain management for fetuses with
painful conditions, and does not require parents to acknowledge the likelihood of
significant pain before authorizing circumcision surgery for their newly born
child.110
Congress has been criticized for relying on unproven “facts” and forcing
physicians to deliver its message to women contemplating abortion. The bill
contains the following factual findings: (i) at twenty weeks after fertilization a fetus
has the “physical structures necessary to experience pain;” (ii) “substantial
evidence” shows that fetus at this gestational age “draw away from certain stimuli”
in a manner that suggests that they are responding to a painful stimulus; (iii) fetus
who undergo prenatal surgery at twenty or more weeks post-fertilization routinely
receive anesthesia; and (iv) “substantial evidence” shows that abortion procedures
are painful to the fetus.111
In November 2005, Congress held oversight hearings on the UCPA Act and
invited two physicians, an attorney, and a medical ethicist to testify.112 Dr.
Kanwaljeet Anand, a pediatrician and professor at the University of Arkansas for
Medical Sciences, testified in support of the proposed law.113 He was previously the
government’s expert witness in the three District Court challenges to the PartialBirth Abortion Ban Act.114 Dr. Anand contended that a fetus is capable of
108

Some authors have suggested providing analgesia for painful fetal conditions, such as
instrumental vaginal delivery. Huang, supra note 106, at 122 (citing V. Glover & N.M. Fisk,
Fetal Pain: Implications for Research and Practice, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOLOGY 881, 881-886 (1999); J.S. Deprest et al., Operative Fetoscopy: New
Perspective in Fetal Therapy?, 17 PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS 1247, 1247-60 (1997).
109

Huang, supra note 106, at 121, 122.

110

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005).

111

Id. at § 2.

112

Erin K. McCormick, House Holds Unborn Child Pain Hearing, THE WILBERFORCE
FORUM, Nov. 8, 2005, http://www.wilberforce.org/article.asp?ID=1041.
113
Id. Dr. Anand has published several studies on neonatal hormonal stress responses. See
K.S. Anand, Relationships Between Stress Responses and Clinical Outcome in Newborns,
Infants, and Children, 21 CRITICAL CARE MED. 358, 358-59 (1993); Sinno H.P. Simmons et
al., Do We Still Hurt Newborn Babies? A Prospective Study of Procedural Pain and Analgesia
in Neonates, 157 ARCHIVES PEDIATRICS & ADOLESCENT MED. 1058, 1058-64 (2003).
114

For a critique of Dr. Anand’s testimony, see Derbyshire, supra note 83. “His testimony
in California, Nebraska, and New York, for which he was paid $450 an hour plus expenses by
the current U.S. government, was based on an evidently dubious and shaky claim of ‘medical
certainty.’” Id.
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experiencing pain after twenty weeks gestation.115 He attacked a meta-analysis of
fetal pain research recently published in the Journal of the American Medical
Association [hereinafter JAMA].116
Dr. Jean Wright, Professor and Chair of Pediatrics at the Mercer School of
Medicine, has worked with premature infants for several decades.117 Based on her
clinical experience, Dr. Wright testified that infants born at twenty-three weeks and
beyond are capable of feeling pain.118 Law professor Teresa Collett testified that
requiring physicians to inform patients about fetal pain would be consistent with the
Court’s informed consent jurisprudence.119
Only one expert witness opposed the UCPA Act. Dr. Arthur Caplan, Director of
the Center for Bioethics and Department of Medical Ethics at the University of
Pennsylvania, opposed the legislation, primarily because there is no medical
consensus on fetal pain and the risks associated with anesthesia outweigh the
possible benefits.120 He also testified that it would be poor public policy for
Congress to decide that a physician must “represent something as a fact which is not
known to be true or agreed upon by the majority of medical and scientific experts as
valid.”121
The hearings were also notable for the physicians and scientists who were not
asked to present evidence. The committee did not hear from Dr. Stuart Derbyshire,
assistant professor of radiology and anesthesiology at the University of Pittsburgh
Medical Center, and a critic of Dr. Anand.122 It did not solicit testimony from any of
the investigators responsible for the JAMA article entitled Fetal Pain: A Systematic
Multidisciplinary Review of the Evidence.123 None of the leading fetal surgery

115

While testifying for the government in the PBABA trials, Dr. Anand acknowledged that
investigators at Britain’s Royal College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists placed the age at
no earlier than twenty-six weeks. Cynthia L. Cooper, ‘Fetal Pain’ Bill New Item on AntiChoice Agenda, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Aug. 16, 2004, http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm/
dyn/aid/1951.
116

McCormick, supra note 112.

117

Id.

118

Id.

119

Id.

120

Id.

121

Id.

122

See generally Derbyshire, supra note 83.

123

Lee, supra note 22. The article was authored by an attorney and four physicians at the
University of California at San Francisco (UCSF) who concluded that fetal pain is unlikely
before the third trimester of pregnancy. Id. UCSF is one of only three U.S. medical centers
selected to participate in a five year study of fetal surgery for spina bifida, the most common
fetal anomaly amenable to surgery, funded by the National Institute of Child Health and
Human Development. Id. See MOMS: Management of Myelomeningocele Study,
http://www.spin abifidamoms.com/english/faq.html (last visited May 4, 2007). The study will
compare the outcome of fetal surgery for spina bifida against the traditional treatment of
surgery after birth. Id.
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centers were represented before the committee.124 The committee did not take
testimony from investigators at Britain’s Royal College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, although Dr. Anand had earlier acknowledged that their research
placed the age at which a fetus could possibly experience pain at no earlier than
twenty-six weeks.125 The UCPA Act is positioned to make a huge impact on
reproductive health. Congress, therefore, has an obligation to consider all of the
available research before imposing this legislation on the American people. Inviting
testimony primarily from those who support the law in question is unfair to
constituents and undermines congressional credibility.
C. Potential Impact of the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act
If enacted, such a law would have a significant effect on abortion providers.
Unlike the law at issue in Rust, the UCPA Act applies to all physicians that practice
abortion, not merely those receiving federal funds.126 In contrast to the challenged
state law in Casey, the UCPA Act does not create an exception where disclosure
would adversely affect the patient’s physical or mental health.127 Further, the UCPA
Act criminalizes violations and imposes penalties ranging from one hundred to two
hundred fifty thousand dollars and suspension or revocation of the violator’s medical
license.128
The impact on women seeking abortion services will be substantial and
multifaceted. After being subjected to the mandatory disclosure, some women will
undoubtedly elect to have fetal anesthesia. According to medical literature, there are
two options for delivering anesthesia or analgesic drugs to the fetus.129 The first
method involves administering anesthesia to the pregnant woman in order for it to
124
Cf. MOMS: Management of Myelomeningocele Study, http://www.spinabifidamoms.
com/english/faq.html (last visited May 4, 2007). For an overview of fetal surgery, see
Michael R. Harrison, Fetal Surgery: Trials, Tribulations, and Turf, 38 J. PEDIATRIC SURGERY
275, 275-82 (2003).
125

Cooper, supra note 115; see also McCormick, supra note 112.

126

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, S. 51, 109th Cong. (2005).

127

Id.

128

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, §2904(d)-(e):
(d) First Offense- Upon a finding by a court that a respondent in an action commenced
under this section has knowingly violated a provision of this title, the court shall notify
the appropriate State medical licensing authority in order to effect the suspension of
the respondent's medical license in accordance with the regulations and procedures
promulgated under section 2905, or shall assess a civil penalty against the respondent
in an amount not to exceed $100,000, or both. (e) Second Offense- Upon a finding by
a court that the respondent in an action commenced under this section has knowingly
violated a provision of this title and the respondent has been found to have knowingly
violated a provision of this title on a prior occasion, the court shall notify the
appropriate State medical licensing authority in order to effect the revocation of the
respondent's medical license in accordance with the regulations and procedures
promulgated under section 2905, or shall assess a civil penalty against the respondent
in an amount not to exceed $250,000, or both.
Id.
129

Huang, supra note 106, at 122.
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cross the placenta and affect the fetus indirectly.130 Congressional findings,
however, discounted the value of indirect anesthesia to the fetus.131 “Expert
testimony confirms that by twenty weeks after fertilization an unborn child may
experience substantial pain even if the woman herself has received local analgesic or
general anesthesia. Medical science is capable of reducing such pain through the
administration of anesthesia or other pain-reducing drugs directly to the unborn
child.”132
The second option, the one chosen by Congress, is the direct administration of
anesthesia or other pain-reducing drugs.133 Yet there are currently “no established
protocols [] for administering anesthesia or analgesia directly to the fetus. . . .”134
Experimental techniques have been employed in laboratory settings but have not
“been shown to decrease fetal pain and are of unknown safety in humans.”135
Another important consideration is that anesthesia, especially general anesthesia,
has emerged as one of the leading causes of abortion related death.136 Consequently,
a woman desiring fetal anesthesia would need an anesthesiologist with sufficient
expertise to achieve optimal fetal anesthesia while ensuring that the woman’s own
health and safety were protected to the fullest extent.137

130

Id. This method is “considered to provide adequate fetal anesthesia” during surgical
procedures on the fetus, such as repair of myelomeningocele. Id. This approach would present
numerous problems. Although inhaled anesthetics cross the placenta, the amount of anesthetic
required to anesthetize the fetus is unknown. Nicola M. Miller et al., The Fetal Patient, in
ANESTHESIA FOR FETAL INTERVENTION AND SURGERY 1, 6 (2005).
131

Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005, § 2(5)-(6).

132

Id.

133

Id. See Huang, supra note 106, at 121-22. This article suggested that when a fetus
undergoes surgery and where the mother has not received general anesthesia, injection of
opioids and muscle relaxants into the umbilical cord or directly into fetal muscle tissue would
decrease the fetal stress response. The article distinguishes between fetal pain and the fetal
stress response.
According to the definitions of pain and feeling, a fetus definitely cannot feel pain.
Fetuses do have hormonal and hemodynamic responses to invasive stimuli, however,
indicating that invasive procedures cause fetal stress responses. The concern of the
authors was that noxious stimuli, even where the fetus is not conscious of it, “most
likely induce[s] long-term neurodevelopmental changes” in the fetus. Fetal stress
responses can be blocked by analgesia, but it is not clear whether effective analgesia
can impact long-term effects. The authors concluded that further study is needed to
ascertain whether analgesia and anesthesia are capable of preventing the long-term
neurodevelopmental effects.
Id. Long-term fetal neurodevelopment is obviously not a consideration when weighing the
benefits of anesthesia or analgesia for abortion.
134

Lee, supra note 22, at 952; see also Huang, supra note 106.

135

Lee, supra note 22, at 952.

136

H.W. Lawson et al., Abortion Mortality: United States, 1972 through 1987, 171 AM. J.
OBSTETRICS & GYNAECOLOGY 1365, 1368-69, 1371 (1994).
137

For a thorough discussion of necessary considerations for fetal anesthesia, see Miller et
al., supra note 130, at 1-12.

2006-07]

FEDERALLY MANDATED INFORMED CONSENT

285

Finding a qualified practitioner could be difficult because fetal anesthesia is just
emerging as a specialty.138 The increased cost associated with specialized anesthesia
might prevent some women from choosing abortion. Issues of access and
affordability would likely delay the abortion procedure, which in turn would create
an increased risk of morbidity and mortality.139 In an analysis of abortion related
deaths occurring in the United States between 1972 and 1987, investigators found
that women having abortions at twenty weeks gestation or later were about eight
times more likely to die as their counterparts undergoing abortion at eleven to twelve
weeks.140 Studies have clearly demonstrated that mandated waiting periods of
twenty-four to forty-eight hours result in women having later abortions later in
pregnancy and there is no evidence that arranging for fetal anesthesia would be
different.141 The probable effect of the UCPA Act on abortion timing and,
consequently, abortion morbidity and mortality are important factors that Congress
should weigh against any perceived fetal benefit prior to voting on this legislation.
One final adverse effect of the UCPA Act is that it subjects a woman’s choice to
the influence of congressional “findings” unsupported by medical consensus. Given
the status often afforded high ranking politicians, these findings may carry more
weight than they merit. Congress does not have the education and training necessary
to make medical recommendations, nor does it have the relationship with or
responsibility to individual patients that doctors have. Where the law has already
established the duty that physicians owe patients and where patients have a remedy
for injuries resulting from breach of this duty, public policy weighs in favor of
138
Laura B. Myers, Fetal Surgery: The Anesthesia Perspective (2003) (unpublished
comment, on file with author). In the preface to this text, physician-authors Laura Myers and
Linda Bulich warn:
With fetal intervention, the anesthesiologist is placed in a unique position, required to
provide anesthesia for two, or possibly three, patients simultaneously. These patients
may each have different and, at times, conflicting anesthetic requirements. . . . As a
result, an anesthesiologist, facing a proposed fetal intervention, may not possess the
necessary information needed to ensure maternal and fetal safety and a successful
intervention without first doing an extensive literature search. Even with the literature
at hand, vast gaps in knowledge exist in regard to the anesthetic care of these patients.
LAURA B. MYERS & LINDA A. BULICH, ANESTHESIA FOR FETAL INTERVENTION AND SURGERY 1
(2005).
139

Lawson, supra note 136.

140

Id. See also Slava V. Gaufberg, Abortion Complications, EMEDICINE, http://www.
emedicine.com/emerg/topic4.htm (last visited May 4, 2007). Press Release, American College
of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, Most Maternal Deaths from Abortion Could be Avoided if
Procedure Performed Earlier (Mar. 29, 2004) (on file with author). “There is a 38% increase in
death risk for induced abortion with each additional week of pregnancy.” Id.
141
American Civil Liberties Union, Government-Mandated Delays Before Abortion (Jan.
15, 2003), http://www.aclu.org/ReproductiveRights/ReproductiveRights.cfm?ID=9045&c=
143. For example, after Mississippi enacted a mandatory waiting period law, “the proportion
of abortions performed after the first trimester increased by 40 percent.” Id. “As the American
Medical Association in its report on abortion states, ‘Mandatory waiting periods [and other
barriers] have the potential to threaten the safety of induced abortion. [They] increase[ ] the
gestational age at which the induced pregnancy termination occurs, thereby also increasing the
risk associated with the procedure.’” Id.
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physicians, not Congress, providing the information patients need to consent in a
truly informed way.
V. INFORMED CONSENT LAWS
In Roe v. Wade, the United States Supreme Court identified a fundamental right
of privacy in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.142 The Court
held that this right of privacy is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision to
terminate her pregnancy.143 On the other hand, the Court recognized a state’s right to
regulate abortion based on its interests in maternal health and in potential life.144 In
Roe, the Court applied a trimester framework and required states to demonstrate a
compelling interest served by laws regulating abortion.145 During the first trimester,
a state’s interests, although important and legitimate, are not compelling.146 Thus any
law that unduly burdens abortion in the first trimester is invalid.147 The states’
interests become greater as pregnancy progresses.148 Shortly after Roe v. Wade,
states began enacting informed consent laws mandating the disclosure of specified
information. The Supreme Court considered challenges to three such statutes in the
immediate aftermath of Roe.
A. Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth
In 1976, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of Mississippi’s
abortion statute, which included an informed consent provision.149 The contested
language provided that “[n]o abortion shall be performed prior to the end of the first
twelve weeks of pregnancy except: . . . (2) After the woman, prior to submitting to
the abortion, certifies in writing her consent to the abortion and that her consent is
informed and freely given and is not the result of coercion.”150 The Supreme Court

142

Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).

143

Id.

144

Id. at 162-63.

145

Id. at 163-64; Leigh v. Olsen, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1343 (D.N.D. 1980).

146

Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
With respect to the State’s important and legitimate interest in the health of the
mother, the ‘compelling’ point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at
approximately the end of the first trimester. This is so because of the now-established
medical fact (internal citation omitted) that until the end of the first trimester mortality
in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. … With respect to the
State’s important and legitimate interest in potential life, the ‘compelling’ point is at
viability.

Id.
147

Leigh, 497 F. Supp. at 1343 (citing Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473 (1977); Bellotti v.
Baird, 428 U.S. 132, 147 (1976)).
148

Roe, 410 U.S. at 162-63.

149

Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).

150

Id. at 85.
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upheld the lower court’s finding that the informed consent requirement was a
constitutional exercise of the state’s authority.151
The Court pointed out that Mississippi’s statute merely required written
documentation of a patient’s informed and freely given consent.152 The Court
defined consent as “the giving of information to the patient as to just what would be
done and as to its consequences.”153 The Court cautioned in dictum that reading
informed consent to mean more than that “might well confine the attending
physician in an undesired and uncomfortable straitjacket in the practice of his
profession.”154 The point at which an informed consent law unconstitutionally
circumscribed the exchange of information between a patient and her doctor would
be squarely presented in future cases.
B. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick
At issue in Franklin, was a Pennsylvania statute making it a first degree
misdemeanor for a physician to perform an abortion without first obtaining informed
consent.155 To meet the statutory “informed consent” requirement the woman seeking
the abortion had to affirmatively state in writing that she had been told that abortion
may cause “detrimental physical and psychological effects which are not foreseeable
. . . . [that there are] alternatives to abortion, including childbirth and adoption, and
[given an explanation of] the medical procedures to be used.”156 A federal district
court upheld the constitutionality of the law.157 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed without rendering a written opinion.158
C. Freiman v. Ashcroft
In Freiman, physicians brought suit to prevent enforcement of a Missouri
law requiring them to inform a woman considering an abortion that if the abortion
resulted in a live infant, her parental rights would be terminated.159 The law also
required that prior to the abortion the physician certify that the fetus was not
viable.160 Since an abortion could not be performed unless the fetus was certified as
nonviable, the court held that the language was “for all practical purposes
meaningless.”161
151
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153

Id. at 67 n.8.
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nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976).
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The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upheld the District Court, concluding
that the provision violated both the Equal Protection Clause and the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.162 The Eighth Circuit went further, conveying
in dictum that the state may not require physicians “to provide to each patient any
and all information required by the state, regardless of its legality, truth,
constitutionality or medical advisability.”163 Again, the United States Supreme Court
summarily affirmed.164
Following the Supreme Court’s instruction in Danforth, Franklin, and Freiman,
states continued to enact legislation dictating the content of informed consent for
abortion procedures.
D. Leigh v. Olson
In this 1980 District Court case, a physician and an abortion counselor challenged
a North Dakota informed consent statute.165 They asserted that providing the
information unduly burdened a woman’s right to decide, in consultation with her
physician, whether to have an abortion.166 The abortion providers in Leigh
specifically disputed the validity of telling patients that abortion was associated with
“psychological trauma . . . sterility and increases in the incidence of premature births,
tubal pregnancies and stillbirths in subsequent pregnancies . . .” where there was
broad disagreement in the medical community over the accuracy of these “facts.”167
The court turned to the standards set by the United States Supreme Court in
Danforth.168 Based on those standards, the court found that the North Dakota statute
went beyond both the definition of informed consent articulated in Danforth and the
medical community’s understanding of the term.169 In addition, the statute prescribed
the giving of information that was of “questionable truth and validity”170 The court
found such information to be a direct burden on the abortion decision.171 As to the
statutory requirement that physicians disclose the “probable anatomical and
physiological characteristics of the unborn child,” the court found that it imposed an
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Id. at 252. “It is a violation of the due process clause because of the invasion into the
delicate and private physician-patient relationship. Requiring the physician to relate section
188.040 interferes with the woman’s right to consult with her physician concerning her
decision of abortion without undue restriction by the state.” Id. It is a violation of the equal
protection clause “inasmuch as it singles out the abortion operation for this ‘straitjacket’
requirement.” Id.
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166

Id. at 1344.

167

Id. at 1345.

168

Id. at 1344 (citing Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976)).

169

Id. at 1345.

170

Id.

171

Id.

2006-07]

FEDERALLY MANDATED INFORMED CONSENT

289

undue burden and additionally found no legitimate medical reason for giving the
information.172
E. Charles v. Carey
In Charles v. Carey, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit consolidated
several appeals from a lower court that were based on the court’s decision not to
enjoin sections of the Illinois Abortion Law of 1975.173 The Seventh Circuit
addressed the constitutionality of three separate sections, which defined the elements
necessary to obtain informed consent.174 Among other things, the statute required a
physician to provide the following information at least twenty-four hours prior to the
procedure: (i) the name of the physician who would be performing the abortion
(although the act mandated that the physician performing the abortion also be the
person providing the informed consent information); (ii) medical risks associated
with the abortion procedure; (iii) probable gestational age of the fetus; (iv) the
availability of state sanctioned materials detailing the anatomical characteristics of a
fetus at various stages of gestation, including information on the possibility of fetal
survival; and (v) a true copy of the patient’s pregnancy test.175 Failure to do so was a
Class B misdemeanor.176 Another section provided criminal penalties for a physician
who failed to “inform the patient of any reasonable medical certainty of organic pain
to the fetus” and methods for controlling fetal pain.177 The law required a patient be
given all of the informed consent information regardless of gestational age.178
The State of Illinois argued that the law did not infringe a woman’s
constitutionally protected right to abortion, and was, therefore, not subject to strict
scrutiny because it applied only to physicians.179 The Seventh Circuit, applying
Danforth, found that a law regulating only physician practice might still impose a
substantial obstacle to the exercise of a woman’s fundamental right if it interfered
with her ability to rely on her physician’s advice.180 The Seventh Circuit held that
the Illinois statute imposed such an obstacle and was, therefore, unconstitutional.181
Further, the court found that, on the basis of the expert testimony in the record, the
required information about fetal pain was “medically meaningless, confusing,
medically unjustified, and contraindicated, causing cruel and harmful stress to . . .
patients.”182
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F. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey
The United States Supreme Court again considered the limits of informed
consent in 1992.183 The statute at issue in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey directed a physician or “qualified nonphysician” to inform the
patient about materials published by the state that describe the fetus, provide
information about medical assistance for childbirth and about child support
obligations, and list agencies that provide adoption.184 Under the law, a woman
could not have an abortion without first certifying in writing that she had been
offered the state published materials.185
The Supreme Court expressly renounced its decision in Thornburgh where it held
that a similar statute was “an outright attempt to wedge the Commonwealth’s
message discouraging abortion into the privacy of the informed-consent dialogue
between the woman and her physician.”186 The Casey plurality said that requiring a
woman be informed about the availability of state published materials, even where
those materials contained information about the “consequences to the fetus” with no
direct relation to the woman’s health, was not a substantial obstacle to obtaining an
abortion.187 The test articulated by the Supreme Court in Casey is whether the
information is “truthful and not misleading.”188 A state’s requirement that physicians
disclose information that meets this standard “may be permissible.”189
Two recently published law review articles maintain that the UCPA Act is
consistent with the plurality opinion in Casey.190 An article by Professor Teresa
Collett discounted claims that the UCPA Act impermissibly intrudes into the doctorpatient relationship.191 The article pointed out that the Casey plurality “specifically
approve[d] the providing of information ‘relating to the consequences to the fetus,
even when those consequences have no direct relation to her [the woman’s]
health.’”192 Fetal pain undoubtedly fits into the category of information approved by
the Supreme Court in Casey. What the argument fails to consider, however, is that
the informed consent statute in Casey required physicians to disclose information
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Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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Id. at 881.
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Id.
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Id. at 883. See Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747
(1986).
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Id. at 882-83. “[I]nformed choice need not be defined in such narrow terms that all
considerations of the effect on the fetus are made irrelevant.” Id. at 883.
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Id. at 882.
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Id. Casey concluded that “[i]f the information the state requires to be made available to
the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be permissible.” Id. See also
Summit Med. Ctr. of Ala., Inc. v. Siegelman, 227 F. Supp 2d 1194 (M.D. Ala. 2002).
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Legislation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 2010, 2025 (2002).
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that the Supreme Court determined to be “truthful and not misleading.”193 If the
UCPA Act passes, the information physicians will be required to give cannot be
fairly described as “truthful and not misleading.” There is currently no consensus as
to when or even if fetuses experience pain.
In the other law review article about fetal pain, the author described the
mandatory fetal pain language in the UCPA Act as, “just a specific form of
information on fetal development that describes a consequence of the fetus’s
anatomical, physiological, and neurological development.”194 Fetal neurological
development is indeed one of the issues involved in the debate about fetal pain.
Experts in the field of fetal development, however, do not agree about the ability of
fetuses to experience pain. Neither do they concur as to the validity of the fetal pain
information contained in the UCPA Act. Although the UCPA Act information
relates to fetal development and is permissible, it fails Casey's “truthful and not
misleading” test.195
G. Summit Medical Center of Alabama, Inc. v. Siegelman
In 2002, a group of health care facilities and physicians challenged the
constitutionality of Alabama’s Woman’s Right to Know Act.196 The Act forced
physicians to give “certain information and a designated set of printed informational
materials . . . ” to women seeking abortion.197 The plaintiffs objected to a section of
the statute mandating that abortion providers inform patients that “an unborn child
with the gestational age of nineteen weeks can survive outside the womb.”198 They
argued that the information was medically untrue and, thus, unconstitutional under
Casey.199
The District Court heard the testimony of several experts, who were able to agree
only that the meaning of “survive” varies between health care providers and in
different situations.200 The court concluded that the language was misleading.201
Although technically truthful, the information was misleading because it was
incomplete. In order to meet Casey's “truthful and not misleading” standard the
court held that abortion providers must go beyond the language of the statute and
inform patients “about the meaning of the term survival as well as the nature and
extent of any possible survival. . . . [J]ust as a woman has a right to know that there
193

Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
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Note, supra note 190, at 2025 (citation omitted).
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Act, ALA. CODE § 26-23A-4(b)(3)(a) (2007)).
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may be even momentary ‘survival,’ she has a right to be fully informed of the nature
of such survival.”202
The standard articulated by the court in Siegelman adopts the definition of
informed consent proposed by research biochemist and philosopher Dr. Irving,203 and
should be considered in any challenge to the fetal pain act. Patients are entitled to
scientifically proven information. Fetal pain, like fetal survival, contains qualitative
components that should be part of the informed consent discussion.
Fetal pain, nonetheless, presents a slightly different problem than fetal survival.
Siegelman considered a statute requiring disclosure of truthful information about
survival that was misleading because it was incomplete.204 The court was able to
remedy the defect by mandating disclosure of additional truthful information, thus,
aligning the statutorily mandated informed consent with Casey’s “truthful and not
misleading” standard.205 In contrast, the obligation that Congress seeks to impose on
physicians via the UCPA Act is to disclose information that is arguably untrue.206
The question of truthfulness is further complicated because there is presently no
scientifically sound way to determine whether fetuses perceive pain.207 Generally,
doctors rely on patients to express and explain their pain and on observable indicia of
pain. A fetus cannot communicate experiences so pain must be measured in some
other way.
There are measurable physiologic signs associated with pain, but their presence
alone cannot confirm the existence of pain.208 Based on what science currently
knows about fetal neurological development, some investigators conclude that
fetuses do not feel pain.209 Even among experts who think that fetuses can feel pain,
there is wide disagreement as to the gestational age where this becomes possible.210
Fetal pain is different from survival in that far less is known about it. Where
experts do not agree on the nature of fetal pain or a fetus’s ability to experience pain
202

Id. at 1204.
[T]he court holds that physicians and qualified persons must go beyond a simple
mechanical reading of this provision and provide the woman with the following
information: 1) a full and complete definition of the term ‘survive’ in accordance with
the physician's good faith clinical judgment; 2) the nature of any survival; 3) survival
is merely a possibility; 4) survival will or may be of extremely limited duration.
(citation omitted) The evidence in the record suggests multiple definitions of the word
‘survival,’ ranging from living to 120 days after birth to simply surviving for a few
minutes.
Id. at 1203.
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at all, physicians cannot simply “go beyond the language of the statute” and
supplement statutorily mandated information.211 To meet their legal duty to present
truthful information, physicians must refrain from presenting information not proven
to be truthful.
Charles v. Carey is the only lower court opinion considering the constitutionality
of informed consent language about fetal pain.212 The Charles court issued its
opinion prior to Casey.213 Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
arrived at the result that Casey would have compelled. The court rejected the fetal
pain language on the ground that the experts did not agree that the information was
accurate.214 Absent consensus in the scientific community, the court was unwilling
to impose on physicians an obligation to convey the state mandated information.215
As Siegelman made clear, the scientific and medical communities are no closer to
consensus today than in 1980 when the Seventh Circuit decided Carey.216
VI. THE JOURNAL OF THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION ARTICLE
A team of physicians at the University of California at San Francisco reviewed
existing literature related to pain in fetuses less than thirty weeks gestational age.217
The pending UCPA Act was the catalyst for their meta-analysis; the stated purpose
was to determine whether a fetus feels pain and, if so, whether safe and effective
techniques exist for administering direct fetal anesthesia. 218
The study first addressed the nature of pain, describing it as a “subjective sensory
and emotional experience that requires the presence of consciousness to permit
recognition of a stimulus as unpleasant.”219 Pain is distinguishable from nociception,
which involves activation of nociceptive pathways but no subjective experience of
pain.220 By way of example, a person with a spinal cord injury will have nociception
211
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Id. at 948 (citing D. Benatar & M. Benatar, A pain in the Fetus: Toward Ending
Confusion About Fetal Pain, 15 BIOETHICS 57, 57-76 (2001) and V. Glover & N.M. Fisk,
Fetal Pain: Implications for Research and Practice, 106 BRIT. J. OBSTETRICS &
GYNAECOLOGY 881, 881-86 (1999) and International Association for the Study of Pain, IASP
Pain Terminology (2004), available at http://www.iasp-pain.org/terms-p.html (last visited
May 4, 2007)).
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without pain below the level of the injury.221 Conversely, a person may experience
pain without stimulation of nociceptive pathways, like phantom pain in an amputated
limb.222
Whether a fetus has the capacity to experience pain depends on several factors.
First, the pathways between the thalamus and the cortex, the thalamocortical
pathways, must be present and functional.223 There are no studies that establish the
point in gestational development at which thalamic pain fibers reach the cortex. The
authors of the JAMA article examined several very small studies from which they
were able to draw inferences about the development of thalamocortical pathways.224
The presence of the pathways, while necessary, is not sufficient to establish the
capacity for pain.225 The structures must also be functional.226
Cortical function is measured using electroencephalography (EEG).227 An EEG
alone, however, is not adequate to demonstrate functionality.228 This is known
because infants born with no functional neural tissue above the brainstem may still
have EEG activity.229 Another drawback to relying on an EEG study is that there is
no known EEG “pain pattern.”230 Some investigators posit that EEG patterns
denoting wakefulness correspond with consciousness.231 Since consciousness is a
requisite of pain perception, this would pinpoint the earliest possible age at which a
fetus might experience pain.232 In pre-term infants, EEG indicators of consciousness
do not appear until approximately thirty weeks.233 EEG alone does not prove
consciousness, however, because patients in a persistent vegetative state sometimes
have EEGs demonstrating wakefulness.234
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Researchers have relied on behavioral indications to prove the conscious
awareness of pain, including withdrawal from a painful stimulus and facial
grimacing.235 The authors of the JAMA article evaluated behavioral studies where
researchers identified a distinct set of facial movements that were present in the
newborn infant during invasive procedures but absent during noninvasive
procedures.236 The earliest age at which these facial movements were identified was
at twenty-eight to thirty weeks.237 One study, however, found no difference in facial
movements in newborns “with and without significant cortical injury,” meaning that
facial movements may not represent conscious perception of pain.238
Other known stress responses, such as vital signs, neuroendocrine changes, and
altered fetal blood flow have been used to imply conscious fetal pain.239 Researchers
have measured stress responses in fetuses undergoing invasive procedures and noted
changes in fetuses as early as sixteen weeks gestational age.240 Still, not all
investigators agree with using neuroendocrine stress response “as a surrogate
indicator of fetal pain. . . . [t]his has limitations: stress responses do not necessarily
signify pain . . . and stress responses do not involve the cortex.”241 The JAMA article
concluded, on the basis of the studies reviewed, that neuroendocrine measurements
are not valid indicators of fetal pain.242
Based on the analysis of the existing studies, which was limited and undertaken
with very small study groups, the JAMA article authors concluded that a fetus cannot
perceive pain until the thalamocortical pathways become functional at around
twenty-nine to thirty weeks gestational age.243 Prior to that time, fetal anesthesia
would be of no benefit to the fetus but would impose added risks to the pregnant
woman.244 Whether fetal anesthesia should be undertaken requires an analysis of its
potential benefit to the fetus and the potential risks to the pregnant woman.245
235

Lee, supra note 22, at 950; Huang, supra note 106, at 119. “Since the fetus cannot tell
us whether he feels pain and since pain cannot be addressed using objective measures, only
indirect methods are useful to determine whether or not the fetus feels pain.” Id.
236

Lee, supra note 22, at 950.

237

Id.

238

Id.

239

Id.

240

Id. See also Huang, supra note 106, at 121. Dr. Anand’s own research measured
hormonal stress responses in newborn infants following invasive interventions. Id. at 120.
241

Id.

242

Lee, supra note 22, at 950-51 (citing G.A. Carrasco & L.D. Van de Kar,
Neuroendocrine Pharmacology of Stress, 463 EUROPEAN J. PHARMACOLOGY 235, 235-272
(2003)). The body mediates neuroendocrine responses without conscious cortical processing.
Id.
243
Id. at 952. Abortion is extremely rare in the third trimester and is only performed to
save the health or life of the pregnant woman. Id.
244
245

Lawson, supra note 136; see also, Miller, supra note 130.

Lawson, supra note 136; Lee, supra note 22, at 952. General anesthesia increases
abortion morbidity and mortality as well as cost. Id. at 952.

296

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 20:267

Critics of the JAMA article have attacked it largely on two grounds: two of the
researchers failed to disclose conflicts of interest, and the article is a meta-analysis of
existing research and presents no new research.246 Dr. Eleanor A. Drey is medical
director of the abortion clinic at San Francisco General Hospital. Her affiliation was
not disclosed in the study and neither was that of another author, reported to have
worked for an abortion rights organization.247 Critics point out that the authors’
failure to consider that these affiliations might be perceived as conflicts of interest
“illustrate the very bias they deny.”248
While not disclosing potentially conflicting affiliations does detract from the
credibility of the entire article, it does not mean that the article completely lacks
merit. Rather, physicians who perform abortions should keep these conflicts in mind
when considering this JAMA article. Prudence would require physicians to review
the underlying research as well as other research in the area of fetal pain. Under the
standard set forth in Siegelman, abortion providers have a legal duty to educate
themselves about the findings of medical studies on the topic of fetal pain.249 Even in
the absence of a legal duty, physicians are ethically obligated to offer patients the
benefit of the latest, scientifically sound information available.
VII. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s reversal of the lower courts has taken pressure off of the
law makers who felt compelled to put a stop to mid-trimester surgical abortion.
Consequently, it is far less likely that these individuals will continue in their efforts
to pass the Unborn Child Pain Awareness Act of 2005. It is foreseeable that in the
future, however, some members of Congress will determine that other abortion
methods should be outlawed. An outright prohibition on those abortion methods that
remain legal would face tremendous social and legal challenges. Legislation targeted
at “informing” a woman about the characteristics of the fetus, however, could be
viewed as merely educational. Any law that mandates what physicians must say to
their patients is potentially problematic. It the case of the Unborn Child Pain
Awareness Act of 2005, one problem was that experts in the area of fetal
development disagreed about whether the information subject to mandatory
disclosure met the “truthful and not misleading” standard.
Society at large believes and government supports the notion that the decision
whether to abort a pregnancy is one that should be made on the basis of all of the
information that is available. Roe v. Wade held that a woman has a constitutionally
protected right to make this decision, and Casey held that a state may not create an
246
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undue burden on a woman in the exercise of this right.250 Casey itself, and
subsequent lower court opinions, have interpreted the phrase “undue burden” to
allow states to impose informed consent requirements on physicians who perform
abortions.251 Under Casey, a state may require a physician to disclose information
that is “truthful and not misleading.”252 According to the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit, requiring physicians to tell patients that a fetus experiences pain
fails Casey’s “truthful and not misleading” standard because it is “medically
meaningless, confusing, medically unjustified, and contraindicated, causing cruel
and harmful stress to . . . patients.”253 Although there has been investigation into
fetal pain during the twenty-five years since Charles v. Carey, medical science
seems to be no closer to reaching an agreement about if and when a fetus feels pain.
Women are entitled to make fully informed decisions about abortion. Until
questions concerning fetal consciousness and fetal pain are more clearly answered,
physicians or other qualified caregivers should provide current, scientifically
credible information. Each woman, acting with the advice of her physician, is then
free to weigh all of the factors involved and make the decision best suited to her
individual needs. To the extent that legislation, such as the Unborn Child Pain
Awareness Act of 2003, prevents a complete discussion of the factors influencing the
abortion decision, it should not be enforced.
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